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Advocates of a strict separation of church and state make a compelling
case that the agnostic and neutral language of the First Amendment is meant
to shield people from public support of religion. These "separationists"
contend that the United States Constitution does not provide any validation
for religious belief in the public sphere. Traditional focus and interpretation
of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution has resulted in a
jurisprudence that interprets the religious clauses primarily as ensuring
"freedom from religion" rather than protecting "freedomfor religion." This
has become the dominant mode of legal thought regarding religious liberty
in the United States.
Religious liberty clauses at the state level offer a different perspective.
An analysis of early and current state constitutions reveals that our federal
political system has a long tradition of accommodating religious liberty.
Furthermore, these state constitutions often validate religion by invoking God
as the foundation of order, liberty, and good government. Advocates of
religious liberty might do better to focus their attention on state constitutions
rather than their national counterpart. State constitutions avoid the agnostic
and neutral language found in the U.S. Bill of Rights and typically offer
stronger protection for religious liberty as well.
To this end, advocates of religious liberty might consider pursuing a
"federal" approach to religious freedom as a means of achieving a higher
level of protection than is found in the U.S. Constitution. An examination of
state constitutions provides compelling evidence that religious freedom, like
many aspects of the Constitution, was meant to be dealt with largely at the
state level.
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AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
Constitutionalism in the United States is a state tradition. On May 15,
1776, just before Jefferson penned the Declaration of Independence, the
Continental Congress adopted a resolution calling on the various colonial
legislatures to draft written constitutions in preparation for statehood. When
independence was declared, the colonies adopted these new constitutions and
became independent American states. By the time of the Philadelphia
Convention in 1787, written constitutions had existed in the United States for
over a decade.
The fifty-five men who gathered in Philadelphia to draft our national
constitution were profoundly influenced by the state constitutional
experience. As a result, the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was slow and
tedious. Contrary to what we often teach school children, this sluggish pace
was not because the attendees were unfamiliar with constitution-making or
constitutional principles. Much to the contrary, the slow deliberation was
largely a result of preconceptions the framers held about what the new
national government should look like. Most of these preconceptions were
based on their respective state constitutions.'
While state constitutions served as reference points for the men of the
Philadelphia Convention, they also served another important purpose. On any
particular issue that lacked consensus, the Framers of the national
constitution often punted the issue back to the states to let them deal with it
on a state-by-state basis. For instance, the procedures for conducting
elections, determining the qualifications for voters, selecting senators, and
choosing presidential electors were all left to the American states to handle.
The U.S. Constitution would remain silent on these issues because there
wasn't a consensus among the Framers as to how to handle these questions
at the national level.
As a result, numerous provisions of the U.S. Constitution refer the reader
back to state constitutions, leading political scientists to argue that the U.S.
Constitution is actually an incomplete document unless state constitutions are
read in conjunction with it. As political scientist Donald S. Lutz writes, the
U.S. Constitution's:
[f]orm and content derived largely from the early state constitutions,
as borrowings and as reactions. These often over-looked documents
occupy a critical position in the development of American
constitutionalism. They are the culmination of a long process, and
the foundation upon which the United States Constitution rests. That
is, the Constitution is an incomplete foundation document until and
1. DONALD LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 97 (1988).
227
228 UNIV OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. VII
unless the state constitutions are also read.2
In short, the U.S. Constitution depends heavily on state constitutions. The
Constitution itself is a product of the state constitutional tradition and makes
use of state constitutions to complete those issues where the U.S. Constitution
is largely silent. Religion is one of these issues.
Religion is addressed most frequently, but not exclusively, in the
preamble of most state constitutions. The purpose of a preamble at the
beginning of a written constitution is largely philosophical. Preambles are not
legally binding. Nor do they establish political institutions or policies. The
main purpose of a constitutional preamble is to provide a statement of values
and beliefs about the origin, operation, and purpose of government. In
essence, constitutional preambles provide the basic beliefs of the
constitutional framers.3 The preamble to the United States Constitution is
probably the best example of this:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.'
In essence, the preamble addresses some of the most fundamental
questions of political theory. In the case of the U.S. Constitution, the
preamble provides the function of government (order, justice, peace,
prosperity), the philosophical justification of government (preservation of
liberty), and the source of governmental authority (the people of the United
States).
A similar pattern is seen in state constitutions, although there are some
striking differences. Since 1776, there have been 145 state constitutions used
by the American states. The number is a product of a greater replacement rate
among state constitutions and unique historical circumstances such as
southern secession.' Almost all of the 145 state constitutions have a
preamble. Only two current constitutions, New Hampshire and Virginia, do
not. These two constitutions start with a Bill of Rights, which in many ways
provides the same philosophical underpinnings of government but has the
added impact of legal enforceability. Putting a Bill of Rights at the beginning
2. Id. at 96.
3. ALLAN G. TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 90 (2000).
4. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
5. Christopher Hammons, Was James Madison Wrong? Rethinking the American Preference
for Short, Framework-Oriented Constitutions, 93 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 837 (1999).
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of the document, rather than at the end, is a common pattern in state
constitutions.'
Table One: Number of Constitutions by
'State
Alabama - 6
Alaska - I
Arizona - I
Arkansas - 5
California - 2
Colorado - 1
Connecticut - 4
Delaware - 4
Florida - 6
Georgia - 10
Hawaii - I
Idaho - 1
Illinois - 4
Indiana - 2
Iowa - 2
Kansas - 1
Kentucky - 4
Louisiana - 11
Maine - 1
Maryland - 4
Massachusetts -
Michigan - 4
Minnesota - 1
Mississippi - 4
Missouri - 4
Montana - 2
Nebraska - 2
Nevada - 1
New Hampshire - 2
New Jersey - 3
New Mexico - 1
New York - 4
North Carolina - 3
North Dakota - 1
Ohio - 2
Oklahoma - 1
Oregon - 1
Pennsylvania - 5
Rhode Island - 3
South Carolina - 7
South Dakota - 1
Tennessee - 3
Texas - 5
Utah - 1
Vermont - 3
1 Virginia - 6
Washington - 1
West Virginia - 2
Wisconsin - 1
Wyoming - 1
State constitutional preambles frequently invoke God as the source of
good government. The reference to God usually takes one of several forms -
the Almighty, the Supreme Being, the Supreme Ruler, Divine Providence, or
simply God. Perhaps more poetically, the South Carolina Constitution of
1868 professes its gratitude to the "Great Legislator of the Universe," while
the Vermont Constitution of 1777 acknowledges the goodness of the "Great
6. TARR, supra note 3, at I1.
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Governor of the Universe." 7
Of the 145 constitutions used by the American states since 1776, eighty
nine constitutions or sixty one percent contain references to God in their
preambles. In most cases these preambles invoke God as the source of good
government, appeal to God for help with good governance, or give thanks
to God for the blessings of good government. The aforementioned Vermont
Constitution of 1777, for example, gives thanks to the "Great Governor of
the Universe" for the blessings of democratic government, noting that He
alone "knows to what degree of earthly happiness mankind may attain by
perfecting the arts of government."' The preamble to the Connecticut
Constitution of 1818 acknowledges "with gratitude, the good providence of
God, in having permitted [the people of Connecticut] to enjoy free
government. . . ."9 The North Carolina Constitution of 1868 states that the
people of North Carolina are "grateful to Almighty God ... for our civil,
7. S.C. Const. (1868); VT. CONST. (1777).
8 VT. CONST. pmbl. (1777).
9. CONN. CONST. pmbl. (1818).
Figure One: State Constitutional
Preambles - All 145 Constitutions
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Reference
39%
Reference
God
61%
Figure Two: State Constitutional
Preambles - Current Constitutions
No
Reference Reference
God
90%
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political, and religious liberties. . . ."o
While it is tempting to say that such references merely reflect the literary
style of early American people or the unique colonial experience of the states
formed during the Revolution, the pattern is not restricted to those
constitutions drafted during the days of the early Republic. Of the fifty
constitutions currently in use by the American states today, an astounding
ninety percent mention God in their preamble. To this end, invocations of
God in state constitutions are not just an artifact of the past.
For example, God is mentioned prominently in the preamble to the
Wyoming Constitution, which gives thanks to "Almighty God for our civil,
political, and religious liberties. . . ."" The current constitution of Wisconsin
is "grateful to Almighty God for freedom. .. ."I2 Washington's Constitution
gives thanks to the "Supreme Ruler of the Universe for our liberties. . . .""
While establishing their constitution, the people of Texas "humbly [invoke]
the blessings of Almighty God. . . ."" Utah is "[g]rateful to Almighty God
for life and liberty. . . ."Is New York professes thanks to "Almighty God for
our freedom. . . ."" Even California operates under a state constitution that
invokes God." In total, forty-five of fifty current state constitutions mention
God in the preamble. The distribution of the five states that do not mention
God in their preambles-New Hampshire, Oregon, Vermont, and Tennessee
and Virginia-indicate that there is no geographical or regional pattern for the
references to God, or lack thereof, in state constitutions.
What state constitutions reveal is that unlike the national constitution,
which is devoid of religious reference, previous and modern state
constitutions explicitly invoke God in the preambles as the basis of good
government, order, and liberty. This is part of a long constitutional tradition
in the United States-a tradition that starts well over 150 years before the U.S.
Constitution was drafted."
RELIGION AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
The American tradition of invoking God in political documents stems
back to the Pilgrims' arrival in 1620. Having survived the long and dangerous
journey to the New World, the exhausted voyagers paused off the shore of
the virgin American wilderness, what would later be Massachusetts, to draft
what many historians and political scientists consider the first glimmer of
10. N.C. CONST. pmbl. (1868).
11. WYO. CONST. pmbl.
12. Wis. CONST. pmbl. (1848).
13. WASH. CONST. pmbl. (1889).
14. TEX. CONST. pmbl. (1876).
15. UTAH CONST. pmbl. (1895).
16. N.Y. CONST. pmbl. (1777).
17. CAL. CONST. pmbl. (1879).
18. DONALD LUTZ, A PREFACE TO AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 113-140 (1992).
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constitutional government in the New World. The famous Mayflower
Compact, named after the tiny ship that carried the Pilgrims across the
Atlantic, is not really a constitution in the modern sense. It does not establish
political institutions, lay out political processes, or define legal rights. Rather,
the Mayflower Compact is an agreement among all free men on the ship to
abide by majority rule in decision-making for the colony. In short, it is a
political arrangement rather like the social contract envisioned by
Enlightenment thinkers. It obligates the members to follow whatever political
institutions and laws are established once the colony is planted. The Pilgrims
felt this was important for their safety and the good of the colony.
While historians and political scientists typically focus on the democratic
nature of the Mayflower Compact, the religious nature is often overlooked.
The first line of the document reads "[i]n the name of God, Amen."" The
invocation is more than just seventeenth century formality or the styling of
religious refugees. For the Pilgrims, the entire premise of the Mayflower
Compact was that it created order by obligating men to follow the will of the
majority. However, the only enforcement powers behind the document were
the ink in which they had signed, their honor, and the fact that they had made
this pledge in the name of God. In essence, the Mayflower Compact was as
much a covenant with God as it was a compact among fellow travelers.
This concept of political documents as covenants between people and
God sounds novel today, but it has a long tradition in American politics.20
Colonial charters of the seventeenth century are rife with religious language,
religious instruction, religious obligations, and religious laws. In fact, a good
portion of these colonial charters enforce church law as the basic means of a
well-ordered society. The blending of religion and politics is pervasive in
early colonial charters like the Virginia Articles (1610), the Massachusetts
Body of Liberties (1641), and the Pennsylvania Charter of Liberties and Plan
of Government (1682).
While the connection between religion and government was strong
during the seventeenth century, which was referred to as the "Planting
Generation," it took a more philosophical turn during the eighteenth
century.2' Much of the philosophical language of the "Founding Generation"
was based on natural law theory that was prevalent during the Enlightenment.
Many Enlightenment thinkers argued that men were endowed by God with
natural rights. They likewise argued the idea that man's freedom was a divine
gift rather than a political creation. This sentiment is evident in our
Declaration of Independence, which, unlike the U.S. Constitution, invokes
God as the source of human rights. This articulation of natural rights became
19. MAYFLOWER COMPACT (1620).
20. LUTZ, supra note 1, at 21-31.
21. JOHN WITrE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT 23-26 (2000).
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the basis for our limited, constitutional government.
The Founding Generation, while perhaps more philosophical and less
religious than the Planting Generation, nonetheless believed that religion was
an important force for the preservation of the fledgling United States. This
generation's argument went something like this: democratic government is
based on the people; the people need virtue and morality to maintain self-
government; religion provides the necessary moral compass and virtue for
self-government; therefore, religion and good government are inherently
linked. John Adams supported this argument through his comment that
constitutional government would only work for "a moral and religious
people." In connection, Benjamin Rush said that while all religions promote
virtue, Christianity was most suited to virtuous government. Even those men
that remained suspicious of organized religion, like Benjamin Franklin and
Thomas Jefferson, still considered the teachings of Christ as valuable to a
virtuous democratic system. Apparently to them the tenets of "love thy
neighbor" and "thy brother's keeper" complemented the democratic ideal.
Because religion was viewed as a complementary part of good
government, the fifty-five men who met in Philadelphia in 1787 harbored no
opposition to religion as a positive social force. Instead, their disagreements
centered on the extent to which government should sanction or endorse
religion. This is why state constitutions play such an important role in our
constitutional system. Well aware of the long religious traditions and stark
denominational differences of each state, the Founders realized there was
very little consensus on the degree, form, or doctrine of worship at the
national level. This awareness led to there being minimal discussion of
religion at the Constitutional Convention since most delegates recognized
that any effort to centralize religious authority was not only unlikely, but
contrary to the purpose of designing a limited national government.
As a result, the U.S. Constitution only references religion in three places.
The first mention of religion is in the No Religious Test Clause found in
Article VI, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution.2 2 This provision prohibits the
requirement that officeholders adhere to or participate in a certain religion.
However, it does not prohibit a person from holding office because they are
religious. The latter formulation would have been foreign to the Founding
Fathers. This provision simply protects people from religious discrimination
without being anti-religious in intent.
The second reference is found in Article II, § 1, which specifies the
wording of the oath of office for the President of the United States. This oath,
which takes into consideration that presidents may be religious, is required
before the President begins execution of the office.23 By its wording, it allows
22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
23. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1.
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a president-elect to affirm rather than swear his duty to uphold the
Constitution. This often overlooked provision is a nod toward Pennsylvania
Quakers who were influential in Pennsylvania politics. It is designed to
accommodate men whose religion would prevent them from swearing
allegiance to anything other than God. Atheists and proponents of a strict
separation of church and state incorrectly read the word "affirm" as providing
a way of avoiding swearing an oath. Thus, they believe that it allows for a
non-reliance on religion in upholding the Constitution. The fact that the
alternative to "affirm" was originally included in the oath to accommodate
religious people has been lost.
The third and most famous reference to religion in the U.S. Constitution
is the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. This clause states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ."2 The prohibition is telling to the
extent that the restrictions are clearly directed towards the actions of the
national government, with no mention of the states. This is because religion,
like many other constitutional issues, was left to the jurisdiction of the states.
The wording of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution when
contrasted with similar religious liberty amendments at the state level helps
make the case that religion has a special status in American state constitutions
that is absent in the national constitution. While the national constitution uses
agnostic language which implies no government interference or endorsement
of religion, most state constitutions take a markedly different approach to
protecting religious liberty. Many state constitutions openly use the word
"God" or make direct reference to the "Almighty" in their religious liberty
clauses. For example, the New Hampshire Constitution states "[e]very
individual has a natural and unalienable right to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and reason; and no subject shall be hurt,
molested, or restrained, in his peers on, liberty, or estate, for worshipping
God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own
conscience. . ."25 The Virginia Constitution reads:
[t]hat religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence; and, therefore, all men are
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the
dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice
Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.26
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. N.H. CONST. art. V.
26. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
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The Nebraska Constitution reads "[a]ll persons have a natural and
indefensible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their
own consciences."27 The Oregon Constitution similarly declares "[a]ll men
shall be secure in their Natural right, to worship Almighty God according to
the dictates of their own conscience." 28
All of the above provisions are still in effect today. It is interesting to
think how different the legal debate over religious freedom in the United
States would be if the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution stated,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free worship of Almighty God." Such a statement would be
an endorsement of religion. The specific reference to God in the provision
would prevent the agnostic or atheistic interpretations that often accompany
First Amendment legal cases today.
The frequent invocations of God in the preambles and in the religious
liberty clauses of state constitutions indicate that religion, far from
vanquished in American constitutionalism, is merely another aspect of our
federal government intended for state jurisdiction. The fact that the
references to God found in state constitutional preambles and religious liberty
clauses are absent in the national constitution indicates that the state language
is more than mere stylistic prose or eighteenth century tradition. If it were
perfunctory language-merely stylistic window dressing for state
constitutions-there would have been little resistance to including similar
language at the national level as well. The absence of such language at the
national level, and near ubiquity at the state level, means the religious
invocations found in state constitutions had significant meaning that the
Framers of the national constitution wished to avoid. In short, religion was
one of the issues that was largely meant to be punted back to the states in our
federal system.
JURISPRUDENCE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
A "federal" perspective on religious liberty-leaving religious issues to
the states-is not widespread in the courts. Judges traditionally view the First
Amendment religious clauses as individual protections against government
power rather than jurisdictional proscriptions. As a result of this
interpretation the separationist position has been easier to defend, because it
imparts an obligation by government to resist state or local activity that might
be construed as supportive of religion. This interpretation requires the
national government to intervene in state and local affairs only when
individuals feel their religious freedom (or freedom from religion) has been
violated.
27. Neb. CONST. art. I, § 4.
28. OR. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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A good example of the court's tendency to interpret the First Amendment
religious clauses as individual protections is the 1985 case of Wallace v.
Jaffree, an Alabama case centered on a father's complaint against his
children's school.29 The father argued that a one-minute voluntary prayer at
the beginning of each school day was a violation of his children's First
Amendment rights, because it amounted to state sanctioned religion and
imposed religious ideals on the children. The Supreme Court concurred in a
6-3 decision, holding that the First Amendment was designed to protect
individuals from attempts by government to interfere with the right to
believe, worship, and express themselves in accordance with the dictates of
their own conscience. The Court further held that the intent of the First
Amendment religious protections was to protect individuals from not only
government, but from religious preferences of the majority as well.30
While this reading of the First Amendment is pretty typical, it overlooks
the possibility that the First Amendment should be viewed in an entirely
different manner. Only recently has a "federal" interpretation of the religious
clauses gained some traction. Most notably, Justice Thomas has argued that
the First Amendment religious clauses are jurisdictional rather than
individual protections.' Political scientists Christopher Banks and John
Blakeman provide some interesting insight into Justice Thomas'
jurisprudence, which relies heavily on a federal perspective in interpreting
the First Amendment:
[fjor Thomas, the clause [the establishment clause] is not a rights-
granting clause that protects individuals from government; rather, it
is a jurisdictional clause regulating the relationship between the
federal government and the states. Thus the federal government has
no power to establish religion at the national level and only minimal
power at best to regulate state and local religious policy-making.
Moreover, the establishment clause can no longer prohibit state and
local policymaking affecting religion, so more power over religious
issues would devolve to state and localities.32
Thomas' interpretation of the First Amendment as implying a federal
relationship on religious issues is evident in his reasoning in two recent cases:
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris and Elk Grove Unified School District v.
Newdow." These cases build on a jurisprudence started a few decades ago
29. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
30. Id.
31. CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS & JOHN C. BLAKEMAN, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND NEW
FEDERALISM: FROM REHNQUIST TO THE ROBERTS COURT 133-188 (2012).
32. Id., at 135.
33. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
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during the Rehnquist years.
The Rehnquist court is credited with creating a new "judicial federalism"
in the 1970's and 1980's by siding with the states in several important cases,
thus acting as a counterweight to decades of expanding power by the national
government. In the Zelman and Newdow cases, Thomas has expanded on this
approach further by suggesting an even more stringent federal position on
religious issues. Thomas could be considered to be advocating what political
scientists call "dual federalism," where the state and national governments
have clearly defined but exclusive powers. The two layers of jurisdiction are
kept distinct, like a layer cake. This is in contrast to "cooperative federalism"
where the national government has involved itself in state affairs and states
assist as administrative agents where needed. In contrast to a layer cake,
cooperative federalism is sometimes diagramed as a marble cake where
jurisdiction is shared and mixed.
Justice Thomas hints at a dual model of federalism in the 2002 case
regarding school vouchers, Zelman. The case dealt largely with the
constitutionality of using vouchers to issue public money to private, religious
schools.34 The Court ruled 5-4 that the issuance of vouchers did not violate
the First Amendment based on five key criteria." Two of the critical criteria
discussed were that the vouchers were not for religious instruction but rather
for general education and that the vouchers were not given directly to
religious institutions but to parents." While Thomas's concurrence focuses
largely on the constitutionality of the vouchers, the language buried in the
middle of the opinion hints at a reevaluation of how the First Amendment,
particularly the Establishment Clause, should be interpreted:
The Establishment Clause originally protected States, and by
extension their citizens, from the imposition of an established
religion by the Federal Government. Whether and how this Clause
should constrain state action under the Fourteenth Amendment is a
more difficult question. . . . Consequently, in the context of the
Establishment Clause, it may well be that state action should be
evaluated on different terms than similar action by the Federal
Government.3
In Newdow, Justice Thomas' federal perspective on the Establishment
Clause is more forceful. The Newdow case was the highly publicized
challenge to the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance. Michael
Newdow, 542 U.S. I (2004).
34. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 678, (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Newdow filed suit on behalf of his daughter, citing a violation of her First
Amendment rights by forced recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, which
includes the phrase "one nation under God."" The Ninth Circuit held in favor
of Newdow.39 However, the Supreme Court later ruled that Newdow did not
have standing to sue, as the mother had sole custody of the child, and the
appellate court's decision was reversed based on procedural grounds. Three
of the nine justices dissented on the issue of standing, arguing the Newdow
did have a basis for filing suit, but nonetheless agreed with the reversal of the
Ninth Circuit's ruling. Thomas' argument in favor of religious liberty was
the most forceful.
Thomas argued that a dual model of federalism should apply to religious
issues, particularly with regard to the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. While the Free Exercise Clause can be incorporated and applied
to the states, the Establishment Clause should be interpreted as jurisdictional
with the intent to shield state religious practices from national interference.
In his concurrence in Newdow, Thomas writes, "I would acknowledge that
the Establishment Clause is a federalism provision, which, for this reason,
resists incorporation. . . . The text and history of the Establishment Clause
strongly suggest that it is a federalism provision intended to prevent Congress
from interfering with state establishments."40
Aside from Justice Thomas, it seems unlikely that the Court will adopt a
"federal" perspective on the Establishment Clause anytime soon. Though
there is a compelling case for such an interpretation, Banks and Blakeman
contend that there are too many forces pushing against a change in the way
the Court looks at the First Amendment. Many of the constituencies that are
most interested in church-state issues-interest groups, local government,
churches-benefit from the current interpretation of the First Amendment
either through protection of their immediate interests or from the opportunity
to foist controversial issues on the national government and hence avoid the
ire of unhappy supporters. As a result of these political motivations and
competing pressures, Banks and Blakeman contend that:
Justice Clarence Thomas's federalism interpretation of the
establishment clause most likely will not evolve to become an
integrated part of the Supreme Court's purported federalism
revolution. The constituencies that would be most affected by a
federalism approach to church-state relations are not supportive of it;
nor are Thomas's colleagues currently on the Court.4
38. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 45-49 (Thomas, J., concurring).
41. BANKS & BLAKEMAN, supra note 30 at 173.
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Justice Thomas may continue to be a lone voice for a federal perspective
on the First Amendment. However, the lack of support at the national level
does not mean advocates of religious liberty should give up hope of a more
favorable jurisprudence. While the courts continue to see the First
Amendment as individual level protections for the most part, they have also
become more responsive to the concept of federalism in general. The
challenge for "accomodationists" is to reorient the debate over religious
liberty as one that views First Amendment protections as providing a
minimum level of protection while state constitutional protections provide a
higher level of protection that is consistent with the intent of the Founders,
the design of our constitutional system, and the protection for freedom of
conscience. Focusing on the religious language found in state constitution is
a place to start.
